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Abstract 
While most studies of the decision to immigrate focus on the absolute income differences 
between countries, we argue that relative change in purchasing power or status, as captured 
by an individual’s ranking in the wage distribution, may also be important. This will in turn 
be influenced by differential levels of supply, demand and migration costs across the skill 
distribution and across countries. Using data on Indian immigrants in the United States and 
the UK matched to comparable data on individuals who remained in India, we show that the 
average Indian immigrant will experience a fall in their relative ranking in the wage 
distribution compared to the position they would have achieved had they remained in the 
origin country.  The fall in relative rankings is larger for immigrants to the UK than to the 
US, and largest of all for those with intermediate skills. 
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1. Introduction 
Do relative rewards influence the immigration decision? Recent empirical 
studies1 have broadened the analysis of the absolute gains to emigration, embedded in 
the extended Roy model of self-selection (Borjas, 1987, 1999), by comparing wage 
levels of similar individuals in both the host and the origin countries. We argue that 
the existing focus on absolute gains, while insightful, misses a potentially important 
aspect of the migration decision, because an individual’s relative position in the wage 
distribution may also be an argument in the decision making process, (see the related 
arguments over concern for relative position advanced in Clark and Oswald, 1998, for 
example). As such location decisions could depend not just on a comparison of 
potential wage levels but also on the relative purchasing power, or status, that moving 
to the host country may command compared to that foregone by moving. A relative 
wage focus can therefore reveal whether any wage gain (or loss) from immigration is 
accompanied by a movement up or down the wage distribution compared to the 
counterfactual had no move taken place. While the absolute income gains are 
expected to be large for most immigrants from a developing to a developed country, 
any negative changes in purchasing power that accompany those absolute gains could 
become a significant, potentially offsetting, factor for the decision to migrate. 
Differences in the levels of demand or supply, between source and host 
country will affect the assimilation profile of immigrants and hence both an 
immigrant’s wage level and their position in the wage distribution in the host country 
relative to that in the source country. As such the positional ranking may be higher or 
lower in the host relative to the sender country. If the cross-country transfer of skills is 
inefficient, then immigrants may be matched to jobs that are not suited for their 
                                                 
1  Bauer, Pereira, Vogler and Zimmerman (2002), Hartog and Winkelmann (2003), Chiquiar and 
Hanson (2005). 
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qualifications. This would mean that immigrants would appear lower down the wage 
distribution of the host country, other things equal, than had they remained in the 
sender country.  
Extending this argument to several potential host countries, then any 
differences in supply or demand patterns across different hosts should mean that 
similar immigrants might be observed at different points in the various host wage 
distributions. This could also be generated by differences in immigration policies or in 
other labour market institutions across countries, which may have differential effects 
on the quality of a job match and hence an individual’s position in the wage 
distribution.  
In what follows, we take immigrants from a single source country, India, and 
compare their positional rankings in the wage distribution of two host countries, the 
United Kingdom, (UK) and the United States, (US), to the counterfactual position in 
the wage distribution they would have attained, had they stayed in India. The two host 
countries are important destinations for Indian immigrants. Indians comprise the third 
largest ethnic grouping of immigrants in the US and the largest group of immigrants 
to the UK. Yet the two host countries have different levels of wage inequality, 
different labour market institutions, different immigration policies, different demand 
patterns and therefore potentially different assimilation profiles for immigrants. 
 
2. Indian Immigration to the USA and the UK 
Every year around 500,000 individuals leave India to go and live elsewhere, 
(Srivastava and Saikumar, 2003)2. Individuals born in India comprise the third largest 
country group of immigrants in the United States and the largest group of immigrants 
                                                 
2  A large absolute outflow, but a small fraction of India’s 1.1 billion population 
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in the UK. There are currently around 1 million individuals born in India living in the 
US, some 0.3% of the host population. There are around 500,000 individuals born in 
India currently living in the UK, some 0.8% of the host population.3 The UK was the 
industrialised host country that received most Indian immigrants until 1970. Since 
then, the US and Canada receive the largest number of Indian immigrants each year 
among the industrialised Western economies.4   
US immigration policy as regards Indian nationals is influenced both by the 
country-specific absolute limits on numbers of immigrants in place since the 1960s 
and the system of preference categories embedded in visa applications skewed toward 
skilled workers or workers in areas in which labor is in short supply, (Wasem 2004).  
While aggregate US immigration numbers are influenced by both documented and 
undocumented immigration, it is likely that the distances involved and lack of land 
borders make undocumented immigration less of an issue regarding Indian emigrants. 
Formal immigration policy has placed country-specific limits on the numbers of 
immigrants since the 1960s, and the system of preference categories embedded in visa 
applications is skewed toward skilled workers or workers in areas in which labour is 
in short supply, along with protection for refugees and reunification of families, 
(Wasem 2004).  The 1990 Immigration Act introduced a system of visas allowing 
entry of high-tech workers with a sponsoring employer for up to 6 years (with the 
subsequent chance of applying for US citizenship) and also raised the share of 
employment-based visas in the total immigrant flow. In practice this has meant that 
immigration from India has been oriented towards highly qualified immigrants since 
the beginning of the 1990s. However, since dependents of immigrants also qualify for 
                                                 
3  Immigrants from India in the UK and in the US comprise, 13.5% and 5% of all new immigrants with 
work permits in the respective host countries, (OECD 2001) 
4 Srivastava and Saikumar (2003) show that the annual flow of Indian immigrants to the UK reached a 
peak of 15,000 in 1970 and subsequently fell back to around 5,000 a year. The flow of Indian 
immigrants to the US is currently around 25,000 a year. 
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entry, family ties still currently account for around 60% of all immigrant entries and 
around 40% of new Indian entrants.5  
As regards the UK, policy has at times, sought to encourage Indian immigrants 
from both ends of the skill distribution. In part this is because over the previous four 
decades, UK migration policy has been greatly influenced by its links with former 
colonies, of which India was the most populous. Before 1962, any commonwealth 
(and hence Indian), or Irish citizen had the right of entry into the UK. A system of 
work permits was introduced after that point and the principle of right of entry to 
commonwealth citizens was abolished in 1973, replaced by a system of work permits, 
(again skewed toward skilled workers in short supply) and entry rights for dependents 
that has continued, subject to periodic modifications, to this day. A recent report from 
the Home Office, (Home Office, 2002), suggests that these legislative changes did not 
change significantly the composition of the reduced numbers of Indian immigrants 
subsequently allowed to settle. 
3. Theoretical Framework 
Both the absolute and by extension the relative wage position of immigrants in 
the host country wage distribution will depend on the assimilation process which in 
turn depends on the return to imported human capital, the degree of accumulation of 
host country-specific human capital and the degree of mobility across the wage 
distribution, Eckstein and Weiss (2004). To the extent that these factors differ from 
the origin country because of cross-country differences in demand, supply or 
institutional features then the wage profiles of movers and stayers will vary. 6  
                                                 
5 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (2004), Table 8.  There are no country-specific estimates of any 
undocumented immigrants. 
6  Two recent studies have suggested that immigrant workers appear to be imperfect substitutes for 
native born workers, (Ottaviano and Peri (2006) for the United States and Manacorda, Manning and 
Wadsworth (2006) for the UK). This would tend to move immigrants down the host country wage 
distribution 
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However concentration on absolute gains alone makes it harder to assess the full 
extent of the consequences of the decision to emigrate. 
We frame our empirical investigations with a simple extension of the Roy 
model of self-selection (Borjas, 1987, Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005), whereby potential 
immigrants face either the origin or host country wage distribution. Wages are 
assumed to depend on observed human capital characteristics of the individual, and 
the rewards to those characteristics. If only one country is considered as a potential 
destination, then the decision to move is made comparing wages in the origin and host 
country net of migration costs. Absolute incomes gains are expected to be large at 
every level of education for immigration from a developing to a developed country. 
Let the wage depend on observed human capital characteristics of the individual, Xi 
and the rewards to those characteristics, but also on characteristics unobserved to the 
researchers such as motivation, or dynamism and captured by the random error term ε. 
Assume instead two host countries for potential migrants who are originally located in 
the origin country (I) then: 
Host:   Ln(wij) = βjIXij + εij   j = UK, US  (1) 
Origin  Ln(wiI) = βIIXiI + εiI      (2) 
where βjI is the reward to given characteristics for individuals i from country I 
working in country j.  As is usual in these models we assume that vector of residuals ε 
~ N(0,Σ) and εI , εj  have correlation coefficients ρIj. If any of these ρ>0 then 
characteristics are rewarded similarly, though not necessarily equally, in each pair of 
countries. Given a cost of migration, π, an individual will mover from India to either 
country if   Ln(wij) - Ln(wiI)  -  π > 0. 
Suppose instead that only relative status matters, then the wage on the left hand side 
of equations (1) to (2) is replaced with position in the wage distribution, POSij the 
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individual i’s positional ranking in the wage distribution of country j which in turn 
depends on a (potentially different) set of characteristics, Z, and rewards, γ 
POSij = γjIZij + uij     j = I, UK, US  (3) 
and the decision to migrate is now based on whether   POSij - POSiI  -  π  > 0. 
Given this, it is possible that potential moves down the income distribution may work 
to offset the potential absolute income gains for some individuals. If so, then 
immigration flows might be lower than would be expected from the simple extended 
Roy model focus on absolute wage comparisons.  
Immigration Costs 
Often the migration literature gives relatively little attention to the costs of 
migration, be it direct transportation costs, barriers to entry imposed by the host 
country, indirect psychic costs such as loss of social networks, loss of visits, contacts 
with the extended family. Borjas (1987, 1999) assumes that π is constant. Yet Borjas 
(1991) acknowledges that the predictions of the Roy model could be changed if the 
costs of migration vary with earnings potential, rather than being constant or 
randomly distributed across individuals. Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) assume that 
migration costs decline linearly with schooling.  
We argue that migration costs are likely to vary by skill and across countries, 
depending on each country’s immigration policies, labour market demands and labour 
market institutions and that the association with skill need not be linear or monotonic. 
The greater the variation in migration costs by skill, the more costs can offset the 
simple predictions of the Roy model. Clearly the work permit/visa systems in place in 
both the US and the UK make the costs of immigration higher for less skilled workers. 
While this may affect the average position of Indian immigrants in the host country 
wage distribution – more higher skilled immigrants relative to the average skill level 
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in the host country would mean that Indian immigrants should feature higher up the 
host wage distribution - this alone, would not be expected to affect an individual 
immigrant’s progression in the host country wage distribution.  
If there are also costs that determine not only who migrates but also how 
quickly those who migrate progress, then some immigrants will end up lower down 
the host country wage distribution than might be expected. First, it may be that the 
transfer of skills is not perfect. This may be caused by language and familiarization 
issues often discussed in the assimilation literature, (Chiswick, 1978). However, there 
may also be other institutional impediments. The “adaptation” process applied to 
immigrants wanting to work in many professions in both the UK and the US may 
hinder progress. For example, nurses who qualified in India may be impeded from 
getting their qualifications validated by unfamiliarity with the system or the actions of 
third parties.7  
At the same time, progression in the respective wage distributions will depend 
on how characteristics are rewarded in the sending and host countries, which in turn 
depends on the relative demand for and supplies of observable and unobservable skills 
in the two countries. Any discrimination or assimilation problems would mean that 
βI>βUS_UK> βUS_UKI. Given differential rewards to immigrants and native-born workers 
in the host countries, individuals with a given characteristic would be observed even 
                                                 
7  Doctors and nurses in the UK with qualifications obtained abroad are required to find a supervised 
job placement in order to do conversion training and have their qualifications “adapted”. The Guardian 
newspaper reports that the system is open to abuse, in that adaptations are either only available in more 
menial jobs or validation may be delayed. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianweekly/story/0,,1316656,00.html 
 Dentists wishing to work in the UK from outside the EU must pass a Qualifying Examination and pay 
the entry fee of £2800. Migration News (2003) reports that some colleges in India "guarantee" students 
an H-1B visa, usually by having a US-based contractor attest that the individual is needed to fill a US 
job. However, once in the US, there may not be a job. Freeman (2003) outlines the institutional barriers 
facing immigrant workers in many professions in the US. 
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higher up the sending country wage distribution, other things equal. Of course this 
could be offset of certain skills were in short supply in the host countries.8  
Thirdly migration networks in the host country can also affect the net cost of 
immigration and subsequent assimilation by providing flows of information and 
assistance. McKenzie and Rappoport (2007) argue that the extent of these networks 
and associated costs also vary by skill.9 
We therefore allow the costs of migration to vary according to an individual’s 
skill and also on the costs imposed by the destination country  
πsj = μπ + δsj     j = US, UK 
where μπ are costs of migration that are constant across individuals and the variable 
cost δsj>0 (δsj<0), depends on host country j and skill level s. These costs are 
unobservable but we do observe wage outcomes and the position of immigrants in the 
host country’s wage distribution.  This wage ranking will reflect, in part, the impact of 
these costs.  
Which of these factors, costs, demand or supply, dominate is ultimately an 
empirical matter and so we proceed to measure wage rankings in both source and host 
country. 
4. Data and Estimation Strategy 
Existing comparative studies, Antecol, Kuhn and Trejo (2006) Antecol, Cobb-
Clark and Trejo (2003a, 2003b) investigate the effect of different institutions on the 
employment and wage-level assimilation of all immigrants across different host 
countries. Their results rely on the assumption that immigrants originating from 
different countries, or within broad continental groupings, assimilate at the same rate 
                                                 
8  The difference in characteristics between the host and source countries also depends in part on the 
participation rates in the respective countries and on who migrates, (Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005). 
9  Networks (or lack of them) in the source country may also be a factor in the decision to migrate 
affecting the selection of who migrates, but leave this issue to future work. 
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in the host countries. Adsera and Chiswick (2004), however show that assimilation 
rates can vary both across countries and within countries by country of origin. A focus 
on immigrants from a single source country could help therefore mitigate the 
influence of unobserved source country effects. 
In order to do this we use three data sets, each containing individual data on 
pay and a set of individual control variables. In each of the three data sets we focus on 
individuals aged 16 to 65, male and female, employed in a full-time job.10  For the US 
we utilise the year 2000 Census 1% PUMS sub-sample (Ruggles et al. 2004).  We 
select individuals working as a full-time employee in the week previous to the 
interview earning a weekly wage of between $100 and $5000. Using the country of 
birth and ethnicity data, we define Indians immigrants as those born in India and who 
are classified as “Asian Indians”. We split the sample into four education groups that 
can be compared across the data sets from the other countries. These categories 
correspond to those who left school before 16, those with some post-compulsory  
education, those with some vocational education and those with a college degree. To 
focus on the decision made after education has been completed, we further select on 
those who migrated after the age at which education was completed. This gives us a 
US sample of around 900,000 individuals, of whom around 3,700 came from India 
after completing their education.  
For the second host country, the UK, we use several waves of the quarterly 
Labour Force Survey11 (LFS) centred on the year 2000. The LFS being a rotating 
panel, where each individual is interviewed for five quarters in a row, we take wage 
responses from the 8,000 working individuals interviewed for the first time in each 
                                                 
10  There is no information on self-employed income in two of the three data sets, so the issue of 
selectivity into self-employment cannot be examined. Nor is there hourly wage information for India, 
hence the restriction to full-time workers. 
11 The UK Census does not report wage data. 
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quarter. To boost the sample size we pool all individuals interviewed over the period 
1997 to 2003. We define “Indian immigrants” as those born in India of Indian 
ethnicity who migrated from India after completing their education. For the host wage 
distribution we trim the top and bottom 0.5% of the recorded wage distribution12. This 
gives us a UK sample of around 75,000 individuals, of whom around 600 came from 
India after completing their education.  
For India, we use the data collected by the National Sample Survey 
Organisation (NSSO), who have conducted representative household surveys in India 
since 1950. The 55th round was conducted between July 1999 and June 2000, with 
820,000 individuals interviewed in around 100,000 households. This gives us a 
sample of 108,000 individuals aged 15 to 65 in full-time employees with wage 
information. 13   This group comprises the set of stayers with which we compare 
relative positional rankings of immigrants, though it will, of course, include any 
return immigrants. We convert all weekly wage data into US dollars using the IMF 
Purchasing Power Parity Index, (PPP), prevailing in the year 2000, (IMF 2000).14  
Estimation 
To assess the relative gains from emigration we simply compare the percentile 
ranking of individuals with similar observed characteristics in the source and host 
countries. To obtain our conditional estimates of the relative gains from emigration 
we use OLS regression estimates from a pooled sample of migrants and stayers based 
on the model: POSi = b0  + γ1Moveri + Zγ + ui , where POSi  is the individual’s 
percentile ranking in the country of living and the coefficient γ1 gives the differential 
                                                 
12  We select only those with a full-time weekly wage between £50 and £3000. 
13 We select individuals working at least 4 days a week (working time is given by the number of ½ 
days at work in the NSS).   
14  The first NSS to contain wage data is the 1983/84 survey. There are no years other than 2000 when 
the data sets for all three countries overlap.  
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position in the host country wage distribution conditional on asset of observed 
covariates, Z. 
When pooling the set of control variables are constrained to be the same for 
the two countries. This can create problems if the covariates or their returns differ 
across countries. For example, Table A1 shows that Indian immigrants are 
concentrated in geographical areas of the two host countries which also happen to be 
associated with wages higher than the average. In a single equation context one could 
introduce regional dummy variables to control for these effects, but in a pooled 
(across-country) regression this is not possible. However using percentiles of the 
wage distribution rather than wage levels, it is possible to net out these regional 
effects, or indeed any other covariates, by taking an individual’s position in the 
residual wage distribution. This also allows the returns to a particular covariate to 
vary between source and host country, which would not be possible when pooling. 
We therefore also rank individuals according to their position using the residuals from 
OLS regressions of log weekly wages on regional dummies for both source and host 
countries. We also compare these estimates with those based on a variety of 
propensity score matching methods across the two cross-section data sets. Here the 
percentile gains to emigration are calculated as the difference between the mean 
percentile ranking for migrants and that of the appropriate matched sample of stayers. 
We also present separate estimates by gender. 
Selection 
Matching on observables may be open to bias if differences in outcomes are 
influenced by unobserveables correlated with both the decision to emigrate and 
progression up the wage distribution. We do not pursue an identification strategy 
based on instrumentation, given the lack of good identifiers in the data, so we can not 
 12
single out the counterfactual population of potential movers among the source 
population other than through observable characteristics. Hartog and Winkelmann 
(2004) argue against using selectivity corrections when the mover sample is small 
relative to the stayer sample. It may be that the quota and visa systems imposed by 
immigration laws will work to negate these unobservable effects somewhat. Since 
migration flows are restricted by institutions, some potential immigrants get lucky 
while others do not. 15 The numbers of Indian emigrants is also small relative to its 
source and host populations so that any general equilibrium effects on the wage 
distribution caused by emigration are also likely to be small. Both host countries are 
English speaking and English familiarity in India is one of the colonial legacies16. 
This should help net out some of the effects of language fluency on assimilation 
across the two countries, highlighted by Chiswick and Miller (1998), Dustmann (2000) 
among others. 
 Lalonde and Topel, (1997) object to using the stayer group as a counterfactual, 
arguing that if any two potential comparator groups are similar they should have the 
same migratory behaviour, (short of an exogenous migration shock to one group). 
Given this objection, it may be feasible instead to use the two sets of Indian 
immigrants in the two host countries to compare relative performance and so assess 
the relative assimilation prospects in both countries. We pursue this strategy in Table 
7 below. 
                                                 
15 McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman (2006) make this argument in their study of Tongan immigrants to 
New Zealand where migration status depends on the result of the outcome of a lottery. Their estimated 
experimental returns to emigration are positive, but some 9 to 80% lower for the randomly selected 
group compared to the results from OLS and IV non-experimental estimation methods, though certain 
propensity score methods produce estimates that are not significantly different from the authors’ 
experimental results. 
16  English is an “associate official language” in India. It is the main medium of instruction at 
postgraduate level, and, in theory, should now be taught as a second or third language from junior 
school onward in all states of India.  However universal enrolment in primary school has still not been 
achieved and the 2001 literacy rate is estimated at 63%, Department of Secondary Education, 
Government of India http://education.nic.in/Elementary/adledu.asp#nlm 
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5. Wage Distributions of Indians in India, the US and the UK 
The summary statistics of our samples of full-time workers are given in Tables 
A1 and A2 of the appendix. The education profile of Indian immigrants to both the 
UK and the US is highly skewed toward university graduates. Around 13% of full-
time employees in India have a university degree, but 36% of Indian immigrants to 
the UK went to college in India and 73% of Indian immigrants to the US. There are 
also more low qualified Indian immigrants to Britain than in the British-born 
population of full-time workers, (Table A1). 
Indians living in the UK arrived earlier, on average, than other immigrants to 
UK, (Table A2).  The US received more of its Indian immigrants in the years 
immediately before 2000. In the UK, the less qualified cohorts arrived earlier, on 
average, than those with higher qualifications. This is also true for other immigrants, 
which reflects, in part, the easier rights of UK entry to Commonwealth residents 
before 1973. In the US, the average length of stay of Indian immigrants is similar 
across skill groups and also compared to other immigrants.17 The proportion of young 
people is lower amongst immigrants than amongst the native populations, as opposed 
to the general rule that immigrants are on average younger than natives. The selection 
in our samples only of immigrants who completed their studies in India together with 
the large proportion of graduates most probably explains this pattern. The immigrant 
stock is also concentrated regionally in both countries, (Table A1). Some 42% of 
Indian immigrants in the British sample live in London, compared to around 8% of 
the native-born population. Likewise some 22% of Indian immigrants to the US live 
in California, compared to around 11% of the native-born population. Since these 
                                                 
17 Our samples may also be affected by no-random return migration, and therefore comments should be 
taken as conditional on those flows. 
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areas are high wage regions, immigrants to these regions will receive higher pay, 
other things equal, than immigrants to other regions. 18  
Figure 1 gives the weekly wage distribution, PPP adjusted, of full-time 
employees observed in the three countries. Not surprisingly the Indian wage 
distribution is to the left of the wage distributions in the UK which in turn is to the left 
of that in the US. However the three distributions do overlap to some extent. The 
Table confirms that wage inequality is much higher in India.19 Table 1 shows that the 
Gini coefficients are the highest in India and next highest in the US compared to the 
UK. This holds both for men and women. Wage inequality amongst Indian women is 
particularly high. Indeed the dispersion of pay among women in India is higher than 
among Indian men, unlike in the UK or the US. In absolute terms, an individual at the 
90th percentile of the Indian distribution earns more than someone at the 10th 
percentile in the UK, but less than those at the 10th percentile in the US.  That the 
wage distributions are not the same across the three countries means that a given 
percentile change in wage rankings implies a different absolute wage change. A one 
percentage point move up the Indian wage distribution is a larger absolute wage gain 
than a one point move in the US, which in turn is larger than in the UK. 
6. Relative ranking changes 
Table 2 gives the unadjusted percentile rankings of immigrants in the host 
country wage distributions disaggregated by education, alongside the equivalent 
percentile rankings of the four education groups in India. Not surprisingly, given the 
smaller graduate share in the Indian population, the average graduate in India is at the 
83rd percentile of the wage distribution compared to the 71st in the UK and 69th 
                                                 
18  Wages in London are some 20% higher than in the other U.K. regions outside the south-east. Wages 
in California and New Jersey are some 10 and 20% higher than the average, respectively. 
19 The bimodality of the Indian data is not caused by our definition of full-time work. The same pattern 
occurs for those working 7 days a week. 
 15
percentile in the United States. The variation around the mean percentile ranking is 
also smaller in India. Similarly those with a secondary education lie much further up 
the wage distribution in India compared to similarly qualified workers in Britain or 
the US. The percentile rankings of Indian immigrants to the UK or the US by 
education are however close to the average rankings of native-born employees by 
education in the host populations (columns 2 and 5). 
Table 3 outlines both the absolute and percentile ranking returns to age and 
education across countries based on separate regressions for movers and stayers. The 
top panel gives results of simple human capital models on the determinants of log 
weekly wage for Indian immigrants to the US and the UK and for native workers in 
India, the US and the UK. The absolute returns to university education are around 
seventy percent greater in India than in the United States which in turn are around 30 
percent higher than in Britain. The absolute return to secondary education is also 
much higher in India. Full-time employees in India with a secondary education earn 
around twice as much, on average, than those with primary education. These returns 
reflect, in part, the relative shares of these education groups in the respective 
populations. The implication of these results for the Roy model of migration is that 
we would expect to see primarily low educated workers among Indian immigrant 
stocks to countries with lower levels of wage inequality. That this is not the case, 
particularly in the US, is apparent from Table A1.20 Institutional barriers to migration 
render the predictions of the simple Roy model unrealistic.  
The OLS estimates of the effect on percentile rankings of the same human 
capital characteristics are shown in the bottom panel of Table 3. Here the advantages 
to university education are closer across countries, reflecting, in part, the wider 
                                                 
20  This finding sits alongside Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) who show that Mexican immigrants to the 
US are drawn primarily from the middle of the income distribution. 
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distribution of wages in India offering a greater reward for a given percentile increase 
in wage ranking.  
The returns to education of Indian immigrants in the two host countries closely 
resemble those of the native born host populations, so that any differential positional 
rankings will not be influenced much by factors that reward education levels of Indian 
immigrants differently from the native born population. However the returns to age 
are much lower for Indian immigrants to both countries, (columns 3 and 6), though 
this may be influenced by the cohort effects observed in Table A2. 
Given these returns to observed characteristics in the sample countries, Table 
4, examines the absolute gains to emigration, based on OLS regressions of the log 
weekly wage on the pooled samples of Indian stayers and Indian immigrants to the 
US, (columns 1 to 3) and the UK, (columns 4 to 6). The Table reports the estimates on 
the mover dummy variable for a variety of different samples and specifications. 
Unsurprisingly, in the absence of any controls, Indian immigrants in the US earn more, 
on average, than Indian immigrants in the UK who in turn earn more compared to 
Indians working in India. 21  The average absolute gains to immigration net of 
observable differences are somewhat closer at 186 and 171 log points in the US and 
the UK (columns 3 and 6 respectively). When the sample is split by education, it 
appears that the largest absolute gains are made by those with the lowest levels of 
educational attainment – with little difference between immigrants to the US and the 
                                                 
21  Note that when pooling data, the coefficient on movers is influenced more by the effect of controls 
from the dominant group, since the difference in average wages between movers, M, and stayers, S in a 
pooled regression is given by MBMXBSXMWSW β−−=−
____
 so  the coefficient on the 
mover dummy is given by BMXSXMWSWM )
__
()
__
( −−−=β , where the vector of coefficients on 
the controls, B is itself a weighted average of the coefficients from the two 
group, MMXMXMXMXSXSXSSXSXMXMXSXSXB
^
)]'(1)''[(
^
)]'(1)''[(
^ ββ −++−+=  
The greater the difference in returns across the two groups, the more is lost by pooling. 
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UK. College-level educated workers gain more in absolute terms by moving to the 
United States. This is consistent with the patterns of wage inequality in the two host 
countries observed above. 
When the sample is split by gender, female Indian immigrants get larger 
absolute gains, on average, in the UK rather than in the US. 22  Female Indian 
immigrants to the UK also receive larger absolute wage gains than male immigrants 
to the UK. Male Indian immigrants receive absolute higher gains in the US compared 
to women and to male immigrants to the UK.23 When we disaggregate by year of 
entry, recent immigrants to the UK receive the largest absolute gains, while recent 
immigrants to the US receive the smallest absolute gains, (Table A3). 
The relative gains to migration are outlined in Table 5 which compares an 
individual immigrant’s percentile ranking in the wage distribution with that of similar 
individuals in the Indian stayers’ wage distribution. The unconditional percentile 
rankings for the whole sample, suggest a gain for immigrants to the US and a small 
fall for immigrants to the UK, (columns 1 and 5). However much of this effect is 
driven by the differential composition of immigrants across the host and source 
countries. Conditioning first on observed personal characteristics, (columns 2 and 6), 
and additional on job characteristics, (columns 4 and 8), the estimated relative 
rankings become significantly negative, suggesting an average fall in the percentile 
                                                 
22  Cobb-Clark (1993) shows that in the US, female immigrants from countries with low income 
inequality and returns to education do better than women from countries with high levels of inequality 
and returns to education. 
23  For those concerned with selectivity into employment, the non-school employment rate of male 
(female) Indian immigrants to the UK are 75% (48%) of which 71% (61%) work as full-time 
employees. The corresponding figures for UK-born workers are 82 (72) and 80 (54). For the US the 
equivalent numbers are 86 (51) for Indian immigrants of which 82% (74%) are in full-time work. For 
native-born US workers the employment rates are 78% (67%) of which 77% (70%) are in full-time 
work. In India, the employment rates are 82% (27%) of which 38% (31%) are in full-time work. The 
regressions results are little changed by restricting the sample to an “after college” sample of 23 years 
and over.  
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rankings in the order of sixteen points in the US and 22 points in the UK. 24 The one-
digit industry and occupation controls account for around one half of the ranking gap 
in the US data and a third of the gap in the UK data.25 When we disaggregate by entry 
cohort, the largest percentile declines in both host countries appear to be amongst 
immigrants who arrived in the eighties. 
When the sample is split by educational attainment, in both host countries, the 
largest ranking falls are amongst Indian immigrants with secondary level of 
qualification, consistent with the larger returns to secondary education in India 
observed in Table 3. The net effect of this and other influences on assimilation mean 
that the average Indian immigrant with a secondary-level education in either the US 
or the UK faces a fall in the wage distribution, and associated drop in purchasing 
power, of around 33 points. Again the occupation and industry controls help explain 
much of this gap. In the UK, the fall for graduates approaches that for those with 
secondary education net of industry and occupation controls.  
When the sample is differentiated by gender (Table 6), the average estimated 
counterfactual percentile change for male and female immigrants is similar, (rows 1 
and 5). Female immigrants with secondary education to either the US or the UK can 
expect the largest fall in rankings. On average an Indian woman with secondary 
education who migrates will fall some 18 points further down the wage distribution in 
the US and 22 points in the UK, net of industry and occupation controls. 
Female graduates also appear to face larger falls than male graduates. Both these 
observations are consistent with the idea of tied movers (see also Antecol, Cobb-Clark 
and Trejo, 2003a). However women with low education appear to drop less compared 
                                                 
24  If selection in labour force participation is an issue, then we underestimate the positional drop in 
rankings if the more motivated immigrants participate in the host country and the less motivated do not 
in the source country. See Chiquiar and Hanson (2005). 
25 We acknowledge the possible endogeneity of industry and occupation controls but believe the results 
are of sufficient interest to justify their inclusion in the Table. 
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to men in both countries, so the tied mover theory may not hold across the distribution 
of skills.26 
Finally, Table 7 compares the position of Indian immigrants in the UK relative to 
Indian immigrants to the US, rather than relative to stayers in India, in order to 
address concerns about the influence of selectivity on the results. If movers are 
different to stayers then comparing the experiences of movers from a single source 
country in two host countries may allow us to identify the effects of the different host 
country institutions on assimilation by netting out the mover fixed effect. If however 
the UK and the US accept Indian immigrants with different unobserved characteristics, 
then this will also influence the positional rankings of Indians in the US and in the UK. 
Table 7 gives give the estimated coefficient on a dummy variable for Indian 
immigrants to the UK based on an OLS regression of position in the wage distribution 
on the country dummy and the set of controls using the sample of immigrants to the 
US and the UK. The absolute wage gains for most Indian migrants are higher in the 
US than in the UK. The largest differences are found amongst graduate migrants, 
however there is little difference in the wage levels for male immigrants with 
secondary-level education.  The positional rankings again confirm that Indian 
immigrants tend to do better in the US than in the UK, with the exception of male 
immigrants with low and intermediate levels of education where the wage rankings 
are not significantly different in the two countries. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
While most studies of immigration focus on the absolute income differences between 
countries, we argue that relative gains to migration may also influence the migration 
                                                 
26 The results based on propensity score matching are similar. Results available from the authors on 
request. 
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decision because of the associated change in purchasing power that position in a wage 
distribution implies. Like the absolute incomes, these relative positions will be 
influenced by differential relative costs across the skill distribution caused by 
differential demand and supply patterns and institutional barriers to migration which 
together can render the predictions of the simple Roy model unrealistic.  
Using data on Indian immigrants working in the United States and the UK 
matched to comparable data on individuals who remained in India, we show that the 
average Indian immigrant will experience an absolute wage gain in the order of 400%.  
The wage gains for Indian men are greater from migration to the US rather than to the 
UK, but Indian women gain more from migration to the UK than to the US.  
However the typical immigrant will also experience a significant fall of up to 
40 points in their relative ranking in the wage distribution compared to the position 
they would have achieved had they remained in the origin country. The relative 
rankings for male university graduates are higher for Indian immigrants to the US 
than to the UK, though the rankings for female university graduates and those with 
secondary education are higher among immigrants to the UK than to the US. 
If an individual’s relative position in the wage distribution is an argument in 
the decision making process then location decisions could depend not just on a 
comparison of potential wage levels but also on the relative purchasing power, or 
status, that moving to the host country may command compared to that foregone by 
moving. The net relative falls in wage distribution that we observe here appear to be 
large and significant for many immigrants. While the absolute wage gains are large 
for many immigrants from developing to developed countries, the results here suggest 
that the accompanying changes in purchasing power can be negative and so could be a 
significant factor in the decision to migrate. 
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Figure 1. Kernel Density Estimates of Log Weekly Wages (Full-Time Workers): 
India, US and G.B (2000) 
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Table 1. Wage inequality in India, UK and US in 2000 (full-time employees) 
 India UK US 
Total    
10 2.78 4.84 5.54 
50 3.69 5.46 6.39 
90 5.21 6.15 7.22 
Gini .509 .305 .393 
Men    
10 3.00 4.93 5.66 
50 3.88 5.55 6.51 
90 5.23 6.25 7.34 
Gini .484 .303 .398 
Women    
10 2.44 4.73 5.44 
50 3.13 5.28 6.22 
90 5.03 5.92 7.00 
Gini .567 .277 .358 
Note: Log of weekly wages for full-time employees, corrected for PPP’s (IMF, 2000).  
 
Table 2. Percentile Rankings by Educational Attainment (Full-Time Employees) 
 India  UK United States 
   UK 
born 
Indian 
immig.
Other 
immig
US  
Born 
Indian 
Immig. 
Other 
immig. 
         
Total    44.8 
(31.9) 
54.8 
(29.8) 
 67.2 
(29.5) 
43.1 
(30.0) 
         
Primary 38.0 
(24.1)
 34.8 
(24.2) 
34.7 
(28.1) 
46.2 
(30.5) 
31.1 
(24.8) 
30.1 
(24.0) 
26.8 
(22.9) 
Secondary 66.2 
(24.4)
 44.9 
(26.9) 
50.2 
(25.8) 
45.2 
(27.5) 
40.7 
(26.1) 
35.4 
(24.8) 
35.7 
(25.8) 
Some 
college 
75.1 
(21.7)
 55.1 
(27.4) 
55.6 
(30.1) 
54.4 
(26.5) 
49.8 
(26.7) 
52.5 
(28.3) 
48.0 
(27.3) 
Graduate 82.5 
(19.3)
 71.5 
(24.1) 
74.3 
(26.5) 
73.1 
(23.7) 
68.5 
(25.5) 
72.9 
(26.6) 
66.8 
(27.6) 
         
Women 34.3 
(30.7)
 40.6 
(27.4) 
35.5 
(29.0) 
48.4 
(28.2) 
43.2 
(27.2) 
57.7 
(30.2) 
39.3 
(28.8) 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. 
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Table 3. Absolute and Wage Percentile Returns to Education Movers and 
Stayers: (Log weekly wage) 
 Indian 
stayers 
 US 
Native 
Indian 
movers to 
US 
 UK  
Native 
Indian 
movers to 
UK 
Absolute        
Female -0.482*  -0.333* -0.288*  -0.292* -0.245* 
 (0.005)  (0.001) (0.030)  (0.003) (0.049) 
        
Age 0.054*  0.058* 0.009  0.087* 0.028 
 (0.001)  (0.0004) (0.012)  (0.0011) (0.017) 
Age2 -0.0005*  -0.0006* -.00004  -0.0010* -0.0003 
 (0.00001)  (0.00005) (0.0001)  (0.00001) (0.0002) 
(primary)        
Secondary  0.429*  0.164* 0.110  0.211* 0.215* 
 (0.005)  (0.003) (0.068)  (0.004) (0.072) 
0.760*  0.338* 0.433*  0.425* 0.303* Some 
college (0.011)  (0.001) (0.069)  (0.005) (0.069) 
University 1.023*  0.743* 0.933*  0.686* 0.629* 
 (0.006)  (0.003) (0.057)  (0.005) (0.051) 
        
N 104023  788177 2511  68632 625 
Adj. R2 0.53  0.31 0.24  0.38 0.30 
        
Percentile Ranking       
       
Female -16.42*  -14.72* -10.97*  -15.77 -15.32 
 (0.15)  (0.05) (1.14)  (0.17)* (2.27)* 
        
Age 1.88*  2.70* -0.51  4.45* 1.45* 
 (0.04)  (0.02) (0.45)  (0.05) (0.85) 
Age2 -0.02*  -0.03* 0.01  -0.05* -0.02 
 (0.005)  (0.0002) (0.005)  (0.0007) (0.01) 
(primary)        
Secondary  14.51*  7.38* 5.04*  11.92* 11.60* 
 (0.14)  (0.11) (2.62)  (0.23) (3.64) 
22.51*  15.49* 20.80*  23.53* 17.68* Some 
college (0.37)  (0.11) (2.67)  (0.27) (3.47) 
University 28.33*  32.54* 40.44*  37.03* 33.42* 
 (0.19)  (0.11) (2.19)  (0.27) (2.55) 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets, ** significant at 5%. Estimates are net of 
controls for age, marital status and region/state. Full-time employees only. The Table 
includes Indian immigrants to the US (col.3) and the UK (col. 5) and native workers 
in India (col. 1), the US (col. 2) and the UK (col.4). 
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Table 4. Absolute Gains to Migration: (Log weekly wage) 
 Indians in USA wrt Indian 
stayers 
 Indians in UK wrt Indian stayers 
Total        
Immigrant 2.852 1.885 1.857  2.253 1.768 1.705 
 (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.016)**  (0.025)** (0.027)** (0.022)**
        
University        
Immigrant 1.90 1.85 1.61  1.68 1.65 1.41 
 (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.022)**  (0.048)** (0.051)** (0.045)**
        
Secondary        
Immigrant 1.80 1.49 1.67  1.86 1.55 1.67 
 (0.029)** (0.030)** (0.029)**  (0.060)** (0.063)** (0.057)**
        
Low        
Immigrant 2.46 2.46 2.19  2.44 2.41 2.12 
 (0.046)** (0.050)** (0.048)**  (0.027)** (0.029)** (0.028)**
        
Men        
Immigrant 2.828 1.903 1.893  2.259 1.692 1.646 
 (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.019)**  (0.032)** (0.032)** (0.028)**
Women        
Immigrant 3.074 1.849 1.776  2.519 1.884 1.832 
 (0.027)** (0.029)** (0.032)**  (0.037)** (0.047)** (0.039)**
        
Demographic No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Occupation No No Yes  No No Yes 
Industry No No Yes  No No Yes 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; ** indicates significant at 5%;  Sample sizes 
106751 (83,375 men and  23,376 women) for the US-India regressions and 104898 
( 82017 men , 22881 women) for the UK-India regressions. 
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Table 5. Relative Percentile Gains to Migration by Education & Year of Entry Cohort 
 Indians in USA relative to Indian stayers  Indians in UK relative to Indian stayers 
Total          
Immigrant 14.6 -13.7 -16.2 -7.9  -4.2 -18.4 -22.2 -16.6 
 (0.6)* (0.6)* (0.6)* (0.6)*  (1.3)* (1.1)* (1.2)* (1.1)* 
Of which          
Sixties arrival 26.3 -5.5 -6.7 2.8  -10.3 -14.6 -19.4 -17.0 
 (2.6)* (2.6)* (2.6)* (2.8)  (2.9)* (2.4)* (2.3)* (3.0)* 
Seventies arrival 18.8 -11.5 -12.8 -1.9  -9.0 -21.8 -26.8 -16.8 
 (1.4)* (1.3)* (1.3)* (1.4)  (2.5)* (2.3)* (2.3)* (2.3)* 
Eighties arrival 10.3 -17.5 -20.5 -9.9  -10.7 -23.3 -27.8 -19.1 
 (1.1)* (1.0)* (1.0)* (1.0)*  (2.7)* (2.5)* (2.5)* (2.4)* 
14.9 -12.6 -13.7 -9.8  5.3 -13.8  -16.6  -14.3 Nineties arrival 
(0.9)* (0.8)* (0.8)* (0.8)* (2.2)* (1.9)* (2.0)* (1.8)* 
By Education          
University Mover -9.6 -10.7 -12.2 -7.8  -18.5 -18.9 -21.4 -17.4 
 (0.6)** (0.6)* (0.6)* (0.7)*  (2.0)* (2.0)* (2.1)* (1.9)* 
Secondary Mover -24.3 -33.0 -34.2 -18.9  -25.1 -30.4 -33.9 -18.4 
 (1.2)** (1.2)* (1.2)* (1.3)*  (2.3)* (2.4)* (2.4)* (2.5)* 
Low Mover -6.6 -6.3 -11.7 -12.4  -12.6 -9.1 -15.1 -14.6 
 (1.9)* (2.0)* (1.9) (2.0)*  (1.6)* (1.5)* (1.4)* (2.0)* 
Controls          
Demographic No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Region No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Industry No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Occupation No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Note: Entries are estimated coefficient and standard errors on mover dummy variable from OLS regression of percentile ranking on set of 
controls. Each cell entry corresponds to the coefficient from a separate regression on the sub-sample highlighted in the row with the set of 
controls given in the column. For example the first cell estimate of 14.6 is the coefficient on the immigrant dummy based on the full pooled 
sample of Indians in the US and Indian stayers with no controls.
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Table 6. Relative Percentile Gains to Migration by Gender & Education 
 Indian in USA relative to  
Indian stayers 
 Indian in UK relative to  
Indian stayers 
Men          
Mover 14.6* -11.8* -13.8* -7.9*  -0.4 -16.9* -21.0* -16.2* 
 (0.7) (0.6) (0.6) (0.7)  (1.6) (1.5) (1.5) (1.6) 
          
Univ. -7.2* -7.9* -9.4* -5.1*  -14.4* -14.7* -17.5* -15.8* 
 (0.7) (0.7) (0.7) (0.8)  (2.2) (2.3) (2.5) (2.8) 
          
Second. -24.0* -31.1* -32.9* -19.7*  -19.3* -25.7* -30.0* -15.9* 
 (1.5) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7)  (2.9) (3.0) (3.1) (3.3) 
          
Low -9.3* -12.0* -17.3* -14.8*  -9.3* -12.5* -18.1* -16.3* 
 (2.4) (2.4) (2.4) (2.7)  (2.5) (2.4) (2.3) (3.0) 
          
Women          
Mover 20.4* -18.0* -19.1* -8.1*  -0.6 -20.1* -24.1* -17.1* 
 (1.1) (1.1) (1.1) (1.1)  (2.0) (1.8) (1.8) (1.6) 
          
Universt. -14.6* -19.7* -20.8* -11.7*  -23.9* -27.1* -29.6* -20.8* 
 (1.4) (1.4) (1.5) (1.5)  (3.7) (3.8) (3.9) (3.3) 
          
Second. -22.0* -36.5* -36.7* -17.9*  -31.5* -38.1* -40.2* -22.5* 
 (2.1) (2.0) (2.0) (2.1)  (3.6) (3.8) (3.9) (3.4) 
          
Low 5.5 4.1 -1.8 -8.1*  -4.4* -5.8* -12.2* -12.9* 
 (2.9) (3.0) (2.9) (3.0)  (1.5) (1.6) (1.5) (2.5) 
          
Controls          
Demog. No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Region No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Occupa. No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Industry No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Note: The native-born Indian default percentiles are 82.6 (84.0/76.9), 67.6 
(68.2/64.0), 38.0 (43.3/21.3) for college, secondary and low, (male/female). The 
interpretation of the individual cell entries is the same as in Table 5. 
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Table 7. Gains to Migration to UK v. USA by Gender & Education 
 Absolute Relative 
Total         
Moved to UK -0.59* -0.33* -0.36* -19.5* -6.0* -7.5* -7.6* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) 
Men         
Moved to UK -0.57* -0.30* -0.38* -16.2* -3.9* -5.2* -6.6* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (1.8) (1.7) (1.8) (1.8) 
University        
Moved to UK -0.45* -0.45* -0.51* -8.4* -8.4* -9.6* -12.2* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.4) 
Secondary        
Moved to UK -0.09 -0.07 -0.12 -4.3 -5.4 -3.0 -3.6 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.7) 
Low        
Moved to UK -0.14* -0.14* -0.20* -1.1 -1.0 -1.3 -1.4 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (3.4) (3.3) (3.2) (4.0) 
        
Women        
Moved to UK -0.55* -0.32* -0.32* -21.0* -9.7* -11.5* -9.2* 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (2.2) (2.3) (2.3) (2.1) 
University        
Moved to UK -0.37* -0.37* -0.38* -9.7* -10.0* -11.5* -11.1* 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (3.8) (3.8) (3.9) (3.2) 
Secondary        
Moved to UK -0.29* -0.30* -0.28* -9.3* -9.8* -12.8* -10.4* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (4.0) (3.9) (3.8) (3.6) 
Low        
Moved to UK -0.26* -0.24* -0.26* -10.1* -9.0* -9.5* -4.1 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (3.4) (3.6) (3.4) (4.2) 
        
Demog. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Region No No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Occupa. No No Yes No No No Yes 
Industry No No Yes No No No Yes 
Note: Figures give estimated coefficient and robust standard error on dummy variable 
for Indian immigrants to the UK relative to Indian immigrants to the United States 
from OLS regression of position on the country dummy and the set of controls listed. 
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Table A1. Sample Means (Full-Time Employees) 
 India Indians in 
UK 
UK-born Indians in 
US 
US-born 
Age 35.3 41.6 38.7 41.5 40.7 
 (11.4) (10.3) (11.3) (10.2) (11.1) 
< age 35 0.36 0.21 0.39 0.34 0.34 
>= age 50 0.20 0.31 0.21 0.25 0.24 
Education:      
Primary 0.68 0.30 0.20 0.06 0.07 
  (0.02)  (0.004)  
Secondary  0.17 0.16 0.38 0.11 0.34 
  (0.01)  (0.006)  
Some coll. 0.03 0.14 0.20 0.10 0.32 
  (0.01)  (0.005)  
Graduate 0.13 0.36 0.21 0.73 0.27 
  (0.02)  (0.009)  
      
Female 0.22 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.43 
  (0.02)  (0.009)  
Single 0.20 0.06 0.32 0.10 0.20 
  (0.01)  (0.005)  
Occupation      
 
  
Agriculture 
(33%) 
Production   
(21%) 
Manager 
(16%) 
Info. Tech. 
(24%) 
Clerical 
(15%) 
 Clerical 
(10%) 
Clerical 
(12%) 
Clerical 
(15%) 
Health 
(12%) 
Manager 
(10%) 
 Construct. 
(8%) 
Health Care  
(12%) 
Mainten.  
(11%) 
Manager 
(11%) 
Production 
(10%) 
 Pers.Serv. 
(8%) 
Mainten.  
(7%) 
Production 
(7%) 
Clerical 
(8%) 
Sales 
(10%) 
Industry      
 Agriculture  
(32%) 
Manufact. 
(30%) 
Manufact. 
(23%) 
Business 
(23%) 
Manufact. 
(17%) 
 Manufact. 
(14%) 
Health   
(17%) 
Selling 
(11%) 
Manufact. 
(17%) 
Selling 
(15%) 
 Public 
admin. 
(11%) 
Business 
(12%) 
Finance 
(10%) 
Health 
(16%) 
Health 
(14%) 
 Construct. 
(8%) 
Selling 
(10%) 
Health 
(9%) 
Selling 
(14%) 
Business 
(9%) 
Region      
 Maharashtra 
(10%) 
London 
(42%) 
South-East 
(21%) 
California 
(22%) 
California 
(11%) 
 Andara 
Pradesh 
(9%) 
South-East 
(15%) 
South-West 
(9%) 
New Jersey 
(14%) 
Texas 
(7%) 
      
N 104261 629 68696 2515 794253 
 
 32
Table A2. Average years since migration of immigrants to the UK and US  
 UK United States 
Origin Country India Other 
immigrants 
India Other 
immigrants
Mean 15.3  
(11.2) 
12.3 
(11.3) 
11.2 
(8.8) 
13.2 
(9.4) 
     
25th percentile 5 3 3 5 
Median 14 9 9 11 
75th percentile 24 20 17 20 
     
Mean years in host country by 
Education: 
    
Low Qualifications 20.0 11.8 11.2 13.3 
Secondary 16.6 15.7 12.6 13.1 
Some college 15.3 10.8 15.4 14.6 
University 10.4 10.8 12.6 12.1 
Note:  Standard-errors in brackets. 
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Table A3. Absolute Gains to Migration by Entry Cohort: Log(weekly wage) 
 Indian in United States wrt 
stayers 
Indian in UK wrt Indian stayers 
Total       
Sixties 3.148 2.026 2.08 2.053 2.016 1.741 
 (0.076)* (0.075)* (0.057)* (0.061)* (0.072)* (0.062)* 
Seventies 3.004 1.955 1.953 2.096 2.047 1.799 
 (0.041)* (0.037)* (0.028)* (0.053)* (0.058)* (0.046)* 
Eighties 2.751 1.798 1.834 2.051 1.976 1.762 
 (0.028)* (0.026)* (0.022)* (0.064)* (0.062)* (0.049)* 
Nineties 2.807 1.882 1.774 2.38 2.32 1.967 
 (0.022)* (0.021)* (0.021)* (0.047)* (0.049)* (0.042)* 
Men       
Sixties 3.082 2.030 2.112 2.052 1.895 1.686 
 (0.081)* (0.080)* (0.081)* (0.069)* (0.080)* (0.079)* 
Seventies 3.080 2.018 2.030 2.146 1.836 1.654 
 (0.052)* (0.047)* (0.045)* (0.081)* (0.070)* (0.071)* 
Eighties 2.737 1.793 1.856 1.996 1.814 1.638 
 (0.034)* (0.032)* (0.029)* (0.092)* (0.084)* (0.060)* 
Nineties 2.761 1.903 1.809 2.345 2.237 1.907 
 (0.025)* (0.023)* (0.028)* (0.053)* (0.059)* (0.051)* 
Women       
Sixties 3.358 2.011 1.901 2.223 2.308 1.940 
 (0.193)* (0.193)* (0.156)* (0.093)* (0.130)* (0.152)* 
Seventies 3.172 1.852 1.822 2.397 2.254 2.003 
 (0.057)* (0.059)* (0.056)* (0.059)* (0.084)* (0.083)* 
Eighties 2.983 1.807 1.778 2.409 2.229 1.980 
 (0.044)* (0.047)* (0.044)* (0.075)* (0.081)* (0.089)* 
Nineties 3.032 1.815 1.692 2.655 2.493 2.055 
 (0.042)* (0.044)* (0.046)* (0.090)* (0.087)* (0.086)* 
       
Demographic No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Occupation No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry No No Yes No No Yes 
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Table A4. Absolute Gains to Migration by Education for Men: Log(weekly wage) 
 Indian in United States wrt 
stayers 
Indian in UK wrt stayers 
Men       
College       
Immigrant 1.949 1.926 1.707 1.632 1.584 1.322 
 (0.020)* (0.021)* (0.025)* (0.062)* (0.066)* (0.053)* 
       
Secondary       
Immigrant 1.798 1.552 1.732 1.882 1.561 1.633 
 (0.037)* (0.039)* (0.036)* (0.070)* (0.084)* (0.079)* 
       
Low       
Immigrant 2.361 2.269 2.071 2.319 2.232 1.993 
 (0.059)* (0.057)* (0.058)* (0.046)* (0.046)* (0.046)* 
       
Women   
College       
Immigrant 1.841 1.620 1.342 1.728 1.496 1.490 
 (0.036)* (0.037)* (0.047)* (0.099)* (0.116)* (0.095)* 
       
Secondary       
Immigrant 1.869 1.397 1.478 1.790 1.431 1.572 
 (0.048)* (0.048)* (0.057)* (0.105)* (0.110)* (0.116)* 
       
Low       
Immigrant 2.842 2.799 2.447 2.664 2.632 2.217 
 (0.072)* (0.074)* (0.084)* (0.038)* (0.038)* (0.055)* 
       
Demographic No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Occupation No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: see Table 4. 
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